



Pretrial motions to dismiss allow criminal defendants to avoid
trial when the prosecution's legal theory is flawed. Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure (FRCrP) 12(b)(2) permits pretrial motions raising
"any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine with-
out a trial of the general issue."' This Comment examines courts' disa-
greement about a procedure under FRCrP 12(b)(2) that will be
termed a motion for summary dismissal. Such motions ask courts to
examine undisputed material facts to determine whether the govern-
ment can prove its case as a matter of law. In this way, summary dis-
missal is roughly analogous to summary judgment in civil procedure.
Consider an example. A defendant awaits trial under a statute that
applies only to "US persons." The indictment alleges that he had once
held lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. The government and de-
fendant agree about certain facts outside the indictment's four corners:
the defendant had moved away from the US after gaining LPR status
and returned infrequently to visit family. These undisputed facts present
two alternative conclusions: either he retains LPR status because it had
not been formally revoked, or he abandons it by moving away.
In the case on which this example is patterned, the district court
held that the defendant abandoned his LPR status as a matter of law
and dismissed because the government could not prove the "US per-
son" element.' The DC Circuit agreed, and explicitly held that defend-
ants may seek dismissal under FRCrP 12(b)(2) when the material facts
are undisputed and the government does not object. But it warned that
these motions are appropriate only in "unusual circumstance[s]" and
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I FRCrP 12(b)(2). "[G]eneral issue" refers to the defendant's "guilt or innocence." See
Charles Alan Wright and Andrew D. Leipold, 1A Federal Practice and Procedure § 191 at 390-93
(West 4th ed 2008).
2 This term is used in the unrelated context of collateral proceedings. See Habeas Relief
for State Prisoners, 38 Georgetown L J Ann Rev Crim Pro 892,930 & n 2762 (2009).
3 See United States v Yakou, 2004 WL 884545, *1 (DDC).
4 United States v Yakou, 428 F3d 241,246-47 (DC Cir 2005) ("[U]ndisputed facts obviated
the need for the district court to make factual determinations properly reserved for the jury.").
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noted the absence of an explicit "criminal procedural mechanism that
resembles a motion for summary judgment."'
While one court refuses to allow summary dismissals at all, the
majority of courts take the DC Circuit's position-permitting sum-
mary dismissals whenever the relevant facts are undisputed, which in
practice means stipulated.! Others require the government to make a
"full proffer of the evidence it intends to present at trial" before the
evidence can be considered undisputed.! Both the minority view re-
jecting, and the near-total scholarly silence regarding, summary dis-
missals likely reflect an overly formalistic, uncreative, and ultimately
incorrect reading of the FRCrP.
Summary dismissals are also welfare maximizing. Prosecutors
would like that they can take an interlocutory appeal from a dismissal,
which they cannot do from directed acquittals before the jury returns
a verdict.o Defendants would like that the motion may allow them to
avoid trial, and that the opportunity to litigate legal questions before
trial fleshes out the expected risks and payoffs of pleading guilty.
This Comment explores and defends the summary dismissal mo-
tion in three parts. Part I outlines the history of pretrial motion prac-
tice and describes background case law on pretrial dismissals, the dis-
missal-acquittal distinction, and double jeopardy. Part II describes the
minority no-dismissals position and shows that most circuits recognize
one of two strong forms of summary dismissal. Part III lays out the
competing policy concerns and argues that summary dismissals are
generally welfare maximizing. A criminal analogue" to civil summary
s Id at 247.
6 See United States v Nabors, 45 F3d 238,240 (8th Cir 1995).
7 See Yakou, 428 F3d at 247. In most cases that are not pleaded out, defendants dispute
the government's factual allegations. See, for example, United States v Todd, 446 F3d 1062, 1068
(10th Cir 2006) (noting that pretrial summary dismissals are "the 'rare exception,' not the rule");
United States v Levin, 973 F2d 463, 466 (6th Cir 1992) (quoting the trial judge, who called it an
"unusual criminal case" because the facts were undisputed).
8 See, for example, United States v Alfonso, 143 F3d 772, 777 (2d Cir 1998). Although
Part II.B explores the distinctions between the proffered and stipulated evidence positions, Part
III.C.2 argues that they should be understood as two sides of the same coin.
9 For the only other scholarly treatment of this issue, see generally James M. Shellow and
Susan W. Brenner, Speaking Motions: Recognition of Summary Judgment in Federal Criminal
Procedure, 107 FRD 139 (1985).
10 See 18 USC § 3731; Anne Bowen Poulin, Government Appeals in Criminal Cases: The
Myth of Asymmetry, 77 U Cin L Rev 1, 15-20,28-30 (2008) (explaining that the government can
appeal from pretrial or midtrial dismissals, or a post-verdict directed acquittal, but not from a
pre-verdict directed acquittal or a jury's acquittal). See also Note, Government Appeals of "Dis-
missals" in Criminal Cases, 87 Harv L Rev 1822, 1829-32, 1834-35 (1974).
11 For an argument supporting this kind of cross-pollination, see David Sklansky and Ste-
phen Yeazell, Comparative Law without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Crimi-
nal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 Georgetown L J 683, 708 (2006) (speculating that the "puz-
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judgment-a stipulated dismissal with burden shifting-turns out to
be the procedure best able to deal with these policy concerns in the
shadow of Supreme Court case law.
I. THE COMMON LAW, THE FEDERAL RULES, AND MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
This Part explains how summary dismissals fit within the FRCrP
framework for pretrial motions. It identifies the common law motion
most analogous to summary dismissal and describes how the FRCrP
reformed-but never rejected-this analogous procedure. It then ex-
plains that criminal defendants normally litigate questions of law as
requests for jury instructions but might litigate these questions at an
earlier stage by using summary dismissals. This Part ends by distin-
guishing dismissals from acquittals: the government is constitutionally
barred from retrying a defendant who is acquitted, but not one who
wins a summary dismissal motion.
A. Motions to Dismiss in Criminal Procedure
Pretrial motions frame parties' strategies and narrow the genuine
issues for trial. The drafters cross-pollinated the FRCrP with principles
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), which predated
them." Two core rules address pretrial motions: FRCrP 47 governs mo-
tions' technical form, while FRCrP 12(b) governs motions' content.
FRCrP 12(b)(2) authorizes "permissive" pretrial motions for rais-
ing arguments that may, but need not, be made before trial. These ar-
guments include "any defense, objection, or request that the court can
determine without a trial of the general issue." Courts interpret the
last phrase as forbidding judges from determining the defendant's
guilt or innocence-the "general issue" in a criminal case.14 Similarly,
in United States v Covington," the Supreme Court interpreted an ear-
lier, substantively identical version of FRCrP 12(b)(2) as permitting
motions whenever "trial of the facts surrounding the commission of
zling" lack of a criminal procedural mechanism analogous to summary judgment reflects pre-
modem practical realities of criminal procedure at common law).
12 See Shellow and Brenner, 107 FRD at 169-72 (cited in note 9) (describing how Rule 47
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure began its "career" as Rule 7(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure). Consider also FRCrP 49, Advisory Committee Note (Second Preliminary
Draft 1944), reprinted in Madeline J. Wilkin and Nicholas Triffin, eds, 4 Drafting History of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 177 (Hein 1991) ("The provision that a motion may be
supported by affidavit may be considered in connection with the discussion of the speaking
motion under the [FRCP].").
13 FRCrP 12(b)(2).
14 Wright and Leipold, 1A Federal Practice and Procedure § 191 at 390-93 (cited in note 1).
15 395 US 57 (1969).
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the alleged offense would be of no assistance in determining the validi-
ty of the defense.""
Defendants can thus seek dismissal by arguing that the indict-
ment is structurally flawed for reasons including venue, immunity,
double jeopardy, and the statute of limitations." This should be distin-
guished from challenges to the indictment's technical sufficiency un-
der FRCrP 12(b)(3)(B). Such challenges argue that the indictment is
flawed in its drafting-for example, because it contains scrivener's
errors or fails to state an element of the offense- rather than flawed
in the merits of the legal question.
FRCrP 12(b)(2) prohibits defendants from making other argu-
ments, as well. First, before trial, defendants cannot raise a "sufficiency
of the evidence" challenge, arguing that the indictment's factual alle-
gations would not satisfy the prosecution's burden of proof.'9 Instead
defendants must raise such challenges using an FRCrP 29 motion for a
judgment of acquittal, testing whether "any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt."20 Such motions "can be entertained, at the earliest, after the
evidence on either side is closed."'
Second, defendants cannot seek summary dismissal merely be-
cause the indictment's factual allegations are untrue, as that is a jury
question central to the "general issue" of guilt or innocence." Courts
avoid invading the province of the jury by refusing to look at disputed
facts that are material to the elements of the offense, whether they
16 Id at 60 (emphasis added).
17 See, for example, United States v Smith, 866 F2d 1092, 1095-96 & n 3 (9th Cir 1989);
James A. Adams and Daniel D. Blinka, Pretrial Motions in Criminal Prosecutions § 11-4 at 917
(Lexis 4th ed 2008).
18 See FRCrP 12(b)(3)(B). Russell v United States, 369 US 749 (1962), articulated the test
for indictment sufficiency. Indictments must "contain[] the elements of the offense to be charged,
and sufficiently apprise[] the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet," with enough
particularity to allow the defendant to avoid double jeopardy in a subsequent prosecution by
"plead[ing] a former acquittal or conviction." Id at 762-64. See generally Note, Indictment Suffi-
ciency, 70 Colum L Rev 876 (1970).
19 See, for example, United States v Sampson, 371 US 75, 78-79 (1962) (explaining that a
mail fraud indictment need not include enough evidence to prove that the offense occurred, but
must instead be "tested by its sufficiency to charge the offense"). Some courts have read Samp-
son as permitting defendants to challenge an indictment only for failure to state an offense. See,
for example, United States v King, 581 F2d 800,802 (10th Cir 1978); United States v Vincenzi, 1988
WL 98634, *3 (D Mass).
20 Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307,317-19 & n 10 (1979). See also Wayne R. LaFave, et al, 6
Criminal Procedure § 24.6(c) at 447 (West 3d ed 2007).
21 United States v Martin Linen Supply Co, 430 US 564,570 n 8 (1977).
22 See, for example, United States v Knox, 396 US 77, 83 n 7 (1969) (explaining that issues
of material fact are not resolvable in pretrial hearings); United States v Nukida, 8 F3d 665, 670
(9th Cir 1993) (noting that FRCrP 12's limitation against deciding "guilt or innocence ... helps
ensure that the respective provinces of the judge and jury are respected").
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appear inside or outside the indictment's "four corners."" Where dis-
putes are major or material to the litigated offense, judges are barred
from deciding factual questions "so intertwined with the general issue
that [the question of law] must be tried with the general issue."24 But
where factual disputes are minor or peripheral, judges can hold li-
mited factual hearings-as long as findings are made on the record.2
Reading the summary dismissal cases together reveals their gener-
al features. First, the facts are undisputed; the defendant does not dis-
pute the indictment's factual allegations. If either party points to facts
outside the indictment's four corners, the other party does not dispute
those external facts.2 Second, the motion challenges the government's
case as legally flawed: even if the indictment's factual allegations-and
relevant "external" facts-are true, the government cannot convict the
defendant on its legal theory. Third, the motion raises a pure question of
law that, if resolved in the defendant's favor, would prevent the gov-
ernment from satisfying its burden on at least one element." Consider
United States v Yakou,8 the case described in the Introduction." The
defendant pointed to undisputed facts outside the indictment, urged
that under these facts he was no longer an LPR as a matter of law, and
argued that he could not be convicted because the government could
not prove the "US person" element as a matter of law.m
Most courts agree that under these circumstances, a district judge
can hear the motion, resolve the legal question, and dismiss if the gov-
ernment has no case to prove. Such a procedure was available at
common law, as Part I.B explains. The FRCrP drafting history detailed
in Part I.C does not indicate why it would not be available today.
B. Speaking Motions at Common Law
The common law governed criminal procedure before 1946, when
the Federal Rules went into effect. The Rules streamlined and replaced
cumbersome and formalistic common law procedures." FRCrP 12(b)
23 United States v Welch, 327 F3d 1081, 1090 (10th Cir 2003).
24 United States v Sisson, 399 US 267,301 (1970).
25 See FRCrP 12(d); Wright and Leipold, 1A Federal Practice and Procedure § 194 at 435-50
(cited in note 1).
26 See, for example, United States v Yakou, 428 F3d 241,246-47 (DC Cir 2005).
27 It could not raise a mixed question of law and fact, which would be a jury question. See
United States v Yasak, 884 F2d 996,1001 n 3 (7th Cir 1989).
28 428 F3d 241 (DC Cir 2005).
29 See text accompanying notes 3-5.
3o Brief of Appellee Sabri Yakou, United States v Yakou, No 04-3037, *6-9, 34-35 (DC Cir
filed Sept 1, 2004) (available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 1950636).
31 See Wright and Leipold, 1A Federal Practice and Procedure § 190 at 382-83 (cited in
note 1) (suggesting that "nobody, except possibly as a matter of nostalgia, mourned the discarding
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consolidated procedures such as demurrers and motions to quash but
retained the old procedures' substance.32
The motion to quash allowed defendants to seek dismissal by
identifying defects showing that "no judgment could be rendered on
the indictment."" Before trial, these motions could only raise ques-
tions of law.' Courts would not quash an indictment simply because
the defendant disputed its factual allegations." Otherwise, judges
would decide whether the defendant's or prosecution's account of the
disputed facts was correct, in turn abrogating the jury's factfinding
role." Doing so would also permit defendants to argue that inchoate
facts alleged in the indictment were insufficient to convince a jury.
Then as today, pleadings needed not include all of the government's
trial evidence, but rather only enough to give the defendant notice of
the charges he would have to defend against.37 Allowing defendants to
dispute the incomplete but sufficient facts set out in the indictment
would be illogical, because allegations are not the government's case.
The constitutional policy favoring jury trial thus precluded trial on the
pleadings where defendants offered an untested version of the facts to
counter prosecutors' allegations."
Courts nonetheless quashed indictments based on undisputed facts
outside the indictment's four corners when they were the "grounds for
the motion."" Such motions "spoke" by pointing to extrinsic facts, and
of the fruitless learning on the complicated question[s]" of common law motion practice). Because
federal common law criminal procedure was limited to the decisions of federal-not state-courts,
see United States v Murdock, 284 US 141,150 (1931), this Part examines only federal cases.
32 See Mark Rhodes, 2 Orfield's Criminal Procedure under the Federal Rules § 12:78 at 272-73
(West 2d ed 2009).
33 P.W. Viesselman, ed, Abbott's Criminal Trial Practice § 62 at 112-13 (Lawyer's Co-op 4th
ed 1939). See also United States v Dustin, 25 F Cases 944,945 (CC SD Ohio 1869):
A motion to quash will not be sustained unless the indictment is bad beyond a reasonable
doubt. This rule has been adopted in view of the fact that nearly all questions involving the
sufficiency of the indictment may be available to the defendant, if a conviction follows, on a
motion in arrest of judgment. It is true, if the indictment is so palpably defective that no
judgment could be rendered on it after conviction, it is the duty of the court to sustain the
motion to quash.
3 See United States v Grunberg, 131 F 137, 138 (CC D Mass 1904).
35 See Shellow and Brenner, 107 FRD at 155-56 (cited in note 9).
36 See United States v Brown, 24 F Cases 1273, 1274 (D Or 1871). See also Viesselman, ed,
Abbott's Trial Practice § 62 at 112-13 (cited in note 33). For the modem perspective, see note 20.
37 See Roger Foster, 2 A Treatise on Federal Practice, Civil and Criminal § 497 at 1662
(Callaghan 1913).
38 See Shellow and Brenner, 107 FRD at 156 (cited in note 9). Compare FRCP 12(d)
(treating a motion for judgment on the pleadings as a motion for summary judgment under
FRCP 56).
39 Foster, 2 Federal Practice § 515 at 1704-05 (cited in note 37). See, for example, United States
v Tallman, 28 F Cases 9, 11 (CC SDNY 1872); United States v Coolidge, 25 F Cases 622,623 (CC D
Mass 1815) (Story) (requiring affidavits to establish external facts supporting motions to quash).
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would later be called speaking motions." But courts would not hear
speaking demurrers, which pointed to extrinsic facts but argued that the
indictment was defectively drafted and failed to state an offense." The
demurrer's challenge to "the viability of the claim alleged" was a tech-
nical question that could be determined on the face of the indictment,42
much like its equivalents in modern practice-FRCrP 12(b)(3)(B)
and FRCP 12(b)(6)." "[E]xtrinsic evidence was irrelevant" to such
questions."
The distinction between speaking motions and speaking demur-
rers disappeared when the Rules consolidated the old formalistic
pleas, although courts largely follow the same functional rules today.
Courts apply the four-corners rule in FRCrP 12(b)(3)(B) motions, as
they did for speaking demurrers: extrinsic evidence remains irrele-
vant.45 By contrast, courts' attitudes toward the four-corners rule for
summary dismissal motions are bound up with whether they permit
summary dismissals at all."
C. Drafting History of the Federal Rules
FRCrP 12(b) incorporated common law motions with little if any
change to the substantive law described above.7 The Rules' drafting his-
tory situates modem summary dismissals within the FRCrP framework.4
Early drafts of FRCrP 12(b)(2) would have permitted defendants
to seek pretrial bench hearings on "any issue of fact."" The drafters
rightly rejected these drafts for two reasons. First, defendants might use
such hearings illicitly "as a fishing expedition to find out just what the
Government's evidence is."'" Second, in such hearings, judges, not juries,
40 See Shellow and Brenner, 107 FRD at 170 (cited in note 9).
41 See id at 154-55. Modern procedure retains the demurrer in FRCrP 12(b)(3)(B). See
note 18 and accompanying text.
42 Shellow and Brenner, 107 FRD at 155 (cited in note 9). See also James M. Kerr, 2 A
Treatise on the Law of Pleading and Practice under the Procedural Codes § 874 at 1245-46
(Bender-Moss 1919).
43 See Shellow and Brenner, 107 FRD at 155 (cited in note 9).
44 Id. General demurrers argued that the alleged facts were insufficient to sustain judg-
ment against the demurring party. Special demurrers argued that the indictment pleaded the
alleged facts using improper form. Each type argued that the facts could not sustain a conviction
even if they were true. For modern iterations, compare FRCrP 29 with FRCrP 12(b)(3)(B).
45 See Note, 70 Colum L Rev at 884 (cited in note 18).
4 For example, some courts consider extrinsic evidence whenever stipulated, but others only
when the government makes a full proffer that includes that extrinsic evidence. See Part II.B.
47 See Shellow and Brenner, 107 FRD at 190 (cited in note 9).
48 For a full discussion of the drafting history, see id at 157-75.
49 See id at 165-66.
50 Joseph T. Votava, Observations on Proposed Rule of Criminal Procedure 13(b)(4), in
Wilkin and Triffin, eds, 2 Drafting History at 98 (cited in note 12).
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would resolve factual disputes." Like common law courts, the drafters
wanted to preserve Fifth Amendment jury-trial rights.5 2 Those asymme-
trical rights give the government no guarantee of a trial at all-let alone
a jury trial." The judge and jury occupy distinct realms, permitting dis-
missals and directed acquittals without usurping the jury's role.5
The drafters used FRCrP 47 to dictate what form motions would
take. That Rule's commentary explains that defendants cannot chal-
lenge the sufficiency of the evidence using a speaking motion." Courts
interpret this as prohibiting defendants from challenging the sufficien-
cy of the evidence before trial." Evidence that has convinced a grand
jury to indict is presumptively sufficient to satisfy the government's
burden of persuading the petit jury.
The FRCrP preserved prior substantive law, which would have
prevented pretrial challenges to the indictment's factual allegations but
not necessarily to its legal allegations." The drafters specifically analo-
gized to summary judgment in civil procedure in determining that pre-
trial challenges to an indictment's factual allegations would be unavail-
able." The FRCrP 47 commentary should be interpreted as reflecting
51 See Shellow and Brenner, 107 FRD at 165-68 (cited in note 9).
52 See note 36. Consider William Mack, ed, 22 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 416
(American Law 1906) (explaining that at common law motions to quash could not "be upon
grounds invading the province of the jury").
53 But see United States v Salman, 378 F3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir 2004), citing United States v
DeLaurentis, 230 F3d 659, 661 (3d Cir 2000). DeLaurentis noted, without citing authority, that
"[t]he government is entitled to marshal and present its evidence at trial, and have its sufficiency
tested by a motion for acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29." 230 F3d at
661 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding Salman and DeLaurentis, extensive research uncovered
no case holding that the government has a right to go to trial. Consider Martin Linen Supply, 430
US at 572 (noting that "the prosecution has no constitutionally sanctioned interest in receiving a
verdict from the jury"). Salman's position seems inconsistent with other asymmetrical rights-
like the right to a directed verdict. See Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 US 275,278 (1993).
5 See Pleasants v Fant, 89 US (22 Wall) 116, 121-22 (1875) (suggesting that a court must
"set[] aside a verdict ... contrary to law" in order to "protect parties from unjust verdicts" deli-
vered by a jury). Dismissal nonetheless implicates separation of powers concerns by "directly
encroach[ing] upon the fundamental role of the grand jury." Whitehouse v United States District
Court, 53 F3d 1349, 1360 (1st Cir 1995). See also United States v Lovasco, 431 US 783, 790 (1977)
("[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit courts to abort criminal prosecutions simply be-
cause they disagree with a prosecutor's judgment as to when to seek an indictment.").
55 FRCrP 47, Advisory Committee Note to the 1944 Adoption.
56 See, for example, United States v Jones, 542 F2d 661,665 n 7 (6th Cir 1976); United States
v Greater Syracuse Board of Realtors, 449 F Supp 887,899 (NDNY 1978).
57 See United States v Hickey, 367 F3d 888,894 (9th Cir 2004) (describing the narrow "con-
stitutional right not to be tried" and noting the corollary that, absent serious government mis-
conduct, "courts generally may not look behind an indictment before trial"). See also note 19.
58 See Shellow and Brenner, 107 FRD at 170-71,196 (cited in note 9).
59 Id at 194-96.
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the prohibition on challenging the indictment's factual sufficiency be-
fore trial. Such challenges are available instead through FRCrP 29.
D. Summary Dismissal in the Larger Context of Criminal Trials
Defendants can use summary dismissal motions to expedite reso-
lution of legal questions that would otherwise be litigated as proposed
jury instructions. But as noted above, they are not an ersatz pretrial
FRCrP 29 motion: summary dismissals do not carry the same double
jeopardy consequences as acquittals. This makes them more analogous
to civil motions to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) than to summary
judgment under FRCP 56.
1. Jury instructions and the legal theory.
If not resolved pretrial, legal questions presented in summary
dismissal motions will be resolved later: during trial, during requests
for jury instructions, or on posttrial motions. In most cases, when facts
are disputed, instructions constrain whatever conclusions the jury
could reach based on its factual findings. For example, in Yakou,
whether the defendant was a "US person" determined whether he
could be convicted at all.62 Because the facts were undisputed, a jury
could only have reached a single conclusion, constrained by the
judge's ruling on the legal question. The district court simply decided
that question earlier than it otherwise would have.
Jury instructions must accurately state the law and must outline
the logic that the jury must follow in matching factual findings to legal
conclusions.' Judges give instructions on the defendant's legal theory
(in addition to the prosecution's) "if the theory is supported by law
and has some foundation in the evidence."" Instructions must there-
fore allow the jury to "understand the defense theory, test it against
60 See Martin Linen Supply, 430 US at 570 n 8.
61 See LaFave, et al, 6 Criminal Procedure § 24.6(c) at 447 (cited in note 20).
62 See notes 3-5 and accompanying text. In Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307 (1979), Justice
John Paul Stevens suggested that courts purporting to engage in sufficiency review were in
fact occasionally considering "legal issues masquerading as sufficiency questions." Id at 329
(Stevens concurring).
63 See United States v Yakou, 2004 WL 884545, *4-8 (DDC).
6 See United States v Hach, 162 F3d 937, 946 (7th Cir 1998) (affirming the district court's
decision not to give defense instructions that were "incorrect or incomplete restatements of the
law"); United States v Piccolo, 696 F2d 1162, 1170 (6th Cir 1983) ("A judge has a duty to give
instructions that are meaningful and translated, not in terms of mere abstract law, but into facts
of the particular case."), vacd on other grounds, 723 F2d 1234 (6th Cir 1983) (en banc).
65 United States v King, 126 F3d 987,995 (7th Cir 1997). See also United States v Tarwater, 308
F3d 494, 510 (6th Cir 2002) (reversing for failure to instruct the jury on a plausible, factually sup-
ported defense theory, which deprived the jury of a theory on which it could rationally acquit).
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the evidence presented at trial, and then make a definitive decision
whether, based on that evidence and in light of the defense theory, the
defendant is guilty or not guilty."" If a jury could not convict on the
undisputed facts and the government's legal theory, it would be irra-
tional to send the case to a jury.
FRCrP 30, which governs jury instructions, allows judges to de-
cide such questions once parties articulate their legal theories-as
early as during the trial. Summary dismissal motions push this in-
quiry earlier, allowing parties to litigate their legal theories before
trial when undisputed facts obviate the need for factual development.
2. Dismissals, acquittals, and double jeopardy.
Courts analogize summary dismissal to summary judgment,6 but
the analogy is imperfect for several reasons.
First, as Justice William Brennan once noted in an unrelated con-
text, "[t]here is no such thing as a motion for summary judgment in a
criminal case."" The FRCrP contain no explicit textual provision akin to
FRCP 56(c),o even though FRCrP 29 is essentially an asymmetrical
version of civil judgment as a matter of law under FRCP 50." If it be-
comes clear during the trial that a rational jury could not convict,
FRCrP 29 permits the judge to enter a judgment of acquittal. Second,
while summary judgment can be entered for either party, courts cannot
enter judgment against a defendant unless the jury returns a guilty ver-
dict, and cannot do so in favor of a defendant until jeopardy attaches.
Third, dismissals and judgments trigger different collateral bars
on relitigating claims in civil cases. Summary judgment is a final adju-
dication on the merits triggering res judicata, as is a dismissal with
6 United States v Barham, 595 F2d 231,244 (5th Cir 1979).
67 See FRCrP 30. The availability of midtrial rulings is discretionary-as are nonbinding
pretrial preliminary instructions. See LaFave, et al, 6 Criminal Procedure § 24.8(a) at 476-78
(cited in note 20).
68 See notes 96 and 136-38.
69 Russell, 369 US at 791 (Brennan dissenting).
70 See United States v Brown, 481 F2d 1035,1042 (8th Cir 1973).
71 See Charles Alan Wright and Peter J. Henning, 2A Federal Practice and Procedure § 461
at 320 n 2 (West 4th ed 2009).
72 See United States v Thomas, 150 F3d 743, 746-47 (7th Cir 1998) (Easterbrook concur-
ring) (noting that courts cannot enter convictions pretrial). See also Serfass v United States, 420
US 377, 388 (1975) ("In the case of a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury is empaneled and
sworn. In a non-jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the court begins to hear evidence.").
One commentator characterizes a summary dismissal as a pretrial directed acquittal. See
James P. Fieweger, et al, Posttrial Motions in Federal Criminal Cases, in Federal Criminal Practice
§ 12.7 (IICLE 2008). The assumption that summary dismissal necessarily has preclusive effects




prejudice-but a dismissal without prejudice is not." A similar distinc-
tion exists in criminal cases. Constitutional double jeopardy protec-
tions prevent the government from reindicting the acquitted defend-
ant or appealing various rulings favoring the defendant."
Jeopardy does not attach at the summary dismissal stage, meaning
the government can retry the defendant." In determining when jeopar-
dy attaches, courts prefer functionalism to formalism. Double jeopardy
rules protect the defendant from government harassment and the "con-
tinuing state of anxiety and insecurity" that comes with being haled into
court for retrial on the same offense." When a defendant seeks a sum-
mary dismissal, he has not yet gone through the trouble of trial. The
government's case is its first, not second, "bite at the apple."
Double jeopardy has attracted attention elsewhere and is outside
the scope of this Comment." For present purposes, the primary doc-
trinal inquiry is "whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label,
actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the
factual elements of the offense charged."" In Serfass v United States,
the Supreme Court held that such resolution does not occur in pretrial
dismissals." It occurs only when "a defendant is 'put to trial before the
trier of facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.'". Defendants
must waive jury trial explicitly under FRCrP 23(a) to get a bench trial;
without a waiver, jeopardy cannot attach even if a judge determines
73 See Schmier v McDonalds, 569 F3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir 2009) (dismissal with prejudice);
Dowd v Society of St. Columbans, 861 F2d 761,764 (1st Cir 1988) (summary judgment); Guzow-
ski v Hartman, 849 F2d 252,255 (6th Cir 1988) (dismissal without prejudice).
74 See US Const Amend V; 18 USC § 3731. See also note 10.
75 See Sklansky and Yeazell, 94 Georgetown L J at 708 & n 92 (cited in note 11) ("Double
jeopardy 'attaches,' barring relitigation, only with the empanelling of the jury, and thus does not
come into effect with dismissals prior to trial."), citing Crist v Bretz, 437 US 28, 35, 37 (1978).
76 See United States v Hunt, 212 F3d 539, 543-44 (10th Cir 2000) (explaining that acquittal
will not be upheld merely because the district court "labeled its decision an acquittal," but will
instead be upheld only if it "actually represents a resolution ... of some or all of the factual
elements of the offense charged"); United States v Velazquez, 490 F2d 29, 33-34 (2d Cir 1973)
(suggesting that although jury empanelment creates a nondispositive presumption of jeopardy,
disposition involves balancing the government's and defendant's interests).
77 Green v United States, 355 US 184, 187-88 (1957).
78 Burks v United States, 437 US 1, 17 (1978).
79 See, for example, Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy and Judicial Accountability:
When Is an Acquittal Not an Acquittal?, 27 Ariz St L J 953,975-76 & nn 105-06 (1995).
8 Martin Linen Supply, 430 US at 571 (emphasis added). See Poulin, 77 U Cin L Rev at
15-20, 28-30 (cited in note 10) (providing a functional justification for the government's ability
to appeal rulings deferred for evidentiary insufficiency). See also United States v Margiotta, 662
F2d 131, 138-39 (2d Cir 1981) (adopting the definition of "a dismissal of a count or a portion
thereof, for purposes of appeal, as the elimination of 'any discrete basis for the imposition of
criminal liability that is contained in the indictment"').
81 420 US 377 (1975).
8 See id at 389-93.
83 Id at 388 (emphasis added).
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"facts and evidence outside the indictment."" Unless the defendant
consents to a bench trial, Serfass indicates that jeopardy does not at-
tach when a judge considers stipulated facts.0
Before trial, judges are "without power to make any determina-
tion regarding [the defendant's] guilt or innocence."" Summary dis-
missal motions resolve legal, as compared to factual, disputes and
should not trigger the preclusive effects of double jeopardy.
II. THE CONFLICTING CASE LAW
Courts have disagreed about summary dismissals since 1973.8 To-
day they disagree about two core issues. The first is what form evi-
dence must take for a defendant to seek summary dismissal. Courts
take three positions. The first categorically prohibits summary dismis-
sals. The second (majority) position permits summary dismissals
whenever evidence is "undisputed," a concept that will be explored in
Part II.B.1. The final position permits summary dismissals based on "a
full proffer of the evidence [the government] intends to present at
trial."" Courts also disagree about the positions that other circuits
take, creating a muddled circuit split.8 Three circuits have not squarely
addressed the question, and district court case law in those circuits var-
ies widely.0 This Part unpacks the split, extracting doctrinal patterns and
8 Id at 389. See also United States v Pecora, 484 F2d 1289, 1293 (3d Cir 1973) (holding that
stipulating facts merely to "attack[] the validity of the indictment did not constitute the waiver
necessary under Rule 23(a)").
85 See 420 US at 393, abrogating dicta from United States v Brewster, 408 US 501, 506
(1972); Sisson, 399 US at 285.
8 Serfass, 420 US at 389.
87 In United States v Brown, 481 F2d 1035 (8th Cir 1973), the Eighth Circuit disagreed with
United States v Ponto, 454 F2d 647 (7th Cir 1971), affd en banc, 454 F2d 657 (7th Cir 1971), which
Brown contended had permitted a district court to "determine[] as a matter of law prior to trial
that a defense was conclusively established." Brown,481 F2d at 1041.
88 United States v Alfonso, 143 F3d 772,776-77 & n 7 (2d Cir 1998).
89 The DC Circuit characterizes the undisputed, proffer, and no-dismissal positions as a 5-3-1
split. See Yakou, 428 F3d at 247 (purporting to join the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits);
id (citing the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits); id (citing the Eleventh Circuit). But the Eighth
Circuit does not support the proffer position. See United States v Nabors, 45 F3d 238, 240 (8th Cir
1995) (describing the government as under "no duty" to reveal all of its proof before trial). See also
Part I.A. This may also mischaracterize the Eleventh Circuit's position, as that court has recog-
nized the proffer position in dicta. See text accompanying notes 135-38. Nonetheless, that court has
suggested that four circuits, not one, reject summary dismissals. See United States v Salman, 378 F3d
1266,1268 n 5 (11th Cir 2004) (purporting to join the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits).
90 For First Circuit cases discussing related issues, see United States v Tavares, 21 F3d 1, 3
(1st Cir 1994) (en banc) (discussing factual stipulations); United States v Barletta, 644 F2d 50, 58
(1st Cir 1981) (refusing on FRCrP 12(b) grounds to allow a court to consider "a substantially
complete portion of the evidence to be introduced at trial" in a pretrial evidentiary ruling). For a
district court case, see United States v Booker, 557 F Supp 2d 153, 155 (D Me 2008).
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explaining the major points of tension before discussing each position
in depth.
Courts also disagree on whether the government must consent to
summary dismissal." They have suggested that this can mean express
consent or implied consent (in the form of waiver).9 As explained in
Part III.A.5, courts and litigants should take the consent requirement
seriously, whatever form it takes.
A. Categorical Prohibition of Summary Dismissals
Courts have justified prohibitions on summary dismissals by
pointing to the absence of an explicit summary judgment procedure in
criminal law. The drafters did not write a procedure like FRCP 56(c)
into the criminal rules." The case that best represents this position is
United States v Nabors.94 The district court dismissed a racketeering
prosecution because, while the indictment alleged that the racketeer-
ing enterprise consisted solely of the defendants, as a matter of law
RICO liability could not attach under such circumstances." The Eighth
Circuit reversed. "There being no equivalent in criminal procedure to
[a] motion for summary judgment," the court held that the district
court's dismissal was improper.
For a Fourth Circuit case discussing related issues, see United States v Forrest, 1999 WL
436743, *1 (4th Cir) (applying the four-corners rule in a venue challenge). For district court cases,
see United States v Souder, 2009 WL 88919, *7 (MD NC); United States v Gosselin World Wide
Moving, 333 F Supp 2d 497, 505 (ED Va 2004) (considering the parties' joint factual stipulations
in a motion to dismiss), affd in part, revd in part on other grounds, 411 F3d 502 (4th Cir 2005).
See also notes 116-18.
For Ninth Circuit cases, see United States v Shortt Accountancy Corp, 785 F2d 1448, 1452 (9th
Cir 1986) (refusing to allow pretrial dismissals based on issues "substantially founded upon and
intertwined with evidence concerning the alleged offense"); United States v Nukida, 8 F3d 665,
670 (9th Cir 1993) (refusing to allow FRCrP 12(b) to act as a pretrial FRCrP 29 in order to "en-
sure that the respective provinces of the judge and jury are respected"); United States v Phillips,
367 F3d 846, 855 n 25 (9th Cir 2004) (distinguishing Shortt and Nukida because "neither party
contested the facts," so "the district court neither 'invade[d] the province of the' jury nor deter-
mined an element"); United States v Blanton, 476 F3d 767, 771 (9th Cir 2007) (rejecting a pretrial
FRCrP 29 motion). Because the Phillips defendant raised a jurisdictional issue under FRCrP
12(b)(3)(B), see 367 F3d at 855, that case does not directly conflict with prior cases and is not
directly on point. It nonetheless makes the Ninth Circuit's position unclear, because its logic
would also apply under FRCrP 12(b)(2).
91 This is intertwined with the first issue. If the government must make a full proffer, then
the government consents by proffering. If the parties must stipulate to each other's factual alle-
gations, then the government's stipulation to the defendant's facts also shows consent.
92 See Yakou, 428 F3d at 247 (cataloguing cases requiring waiver of objection). Compare
United States v Flores, 404 F3d 320, 325 (5th Cir 2005) (express consent) with United States v
Levin, 973 F2d 463,466 (6th Cir 1992) (implied consent).
93 See notes 69-70.
94 45 F3d 238 (8th Cir 1995).
95 Id at 240.
96 Id.
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Nabors rejected summary dismissal even though, in the dissent's
words, "it [was] abundantly clear from the pretrial record that the
government [could not] prove the charged violation at trial."" The
majority expressed concern that defendants would use summary dis-
missal as a fishing expedition to discover the facts behind the govern-
ment's theory. Because defendants have limited pretrial discovery
rights, the court said, "the government has no duty to reveal all its
proof before trial.""
The Eighth Circuit's post-Nabors cases have reaffirmed its cate-
gorical prohibition. Years ago, that court indicated in dicta that sum-
mary dismissals might be acceptable in certain circumstances, but that
dicta should not be interpreted as surviving Nabors.'"9 Indeed, Nabors
and its progeny seem to be the only cases that categorically prohibit
summary dismissals in all circumstances.
One might think that other courts would cite Nabors as authority
for rejecting summary dismissals. But, curiously, courts nationwide
instead overwhelmingly cite two Eleventh Circuit cases - United States
v Critzero' and United States v Salman"- for that proposition."'a Those
two cases indicate disapproval of summary dismissals but include dicta
suggesting that dismissal might be proper if the government were to
proffer its evidence. Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit's position
may derive in part from a misunderstanding of summary dismissal as a
function of FRCrP 12(b)(3)(B)o-in other words, misunderstanding it
as a specific demurrer rather than as a motion to quash.
9 Id at 242-43 (Heaney dissenting).
98 Nabors, 45 F3d at 240 (majority). For a discussion of pretrial discovery rights, see gener-
ally Victor Rocco and Eric Creizman, Government Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 16 and 18 U.S.C
§ 3500, in Diana Parker, ed, Defending Criminal Cases: Attacking the Government's Proof § 4
(Law Journal Press 2009).
9 See, for example, United States v Ferro, 252 F3d 964, 965-66 (8th Cir 2001) (reversing a
summary dismissal that the district court mischaracterized as dismissal for "failure to state an
offense"); United States v Berner, 587 F Supp 2d 1105, 1111 (D SD 2008) (denying the defend-
ant's motion to dismiss because "there [was] no explicit authority to grant a pre-trial judgment as
a matter of law on the merits" and suggesting that "a district court cannot employ a 'criminal
summary judgment procedure' to dismiss an indictment").
100 See Brown, 481 F2d at 1040-41. See also notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
101 951 F2d 306 (11th Cir 1992).
102 378 F3d 1266 (11th Cir 2004) (per curiam).
103 See, for example, Blanton, 476 F3d at 771; United States v Mummert, 2005 WL 2291004,
*4 (ND Iowa).
104 See text accompanying notes 136-38.
105 See United States v Sharpe, 438 F3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir 2006) (citing Salman and Critz-
er for the proposition that "[t]he sufficiency of a criminal indictment is determined from its
face"). Yet it does so in the context of a FRCrP 12(b)(3)(B) challenge-not a FRCrP 12(b)(2)
challenge, for which most courts cite those cases. See note 44.
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B. Undisputed Evidence: Stipulated or Proffered?
The rest of the circuits to have considered summary dismissals
adopt either of the remaining positions, both of which agree that un-
disputed facts are necessary for dismissal. They disagree about wheth-
er facts must be proffered by the government, or undisputed in some
other way. These positions allocate control to the government and to
the defendant, respectively.
The undisputed-evidence requirement derives from Covington:
when facts are undisputed, "trial of the facts" is "of no assistance."' If
either party disagrees with the other party's allegations of material
fact, the judge must deny the motion on procedural grounds, and the
dispute must go to the factfinder.m Similarly, elements (materiality or
reasonableness) and defenses (insanity or alibi) that involve mixed
questions of law and fact would be inappropriate for resolution
through summary dismissal.! The rest of this Part considers these two
positions before attempting to reconcile them in Part III.C.2.
1. Undisputed (stipulated) evidence.
Most courts allow summary dismissals whenever the facts are un-
disputed, even if they do not articulate how parties indicate that the
facts are undisputed. In practice, the parties would probably have to
stipulate facts. For example, in United States v DeLaurentis,' the Third
Circuit reversed a summary dismissal because it was not based on a
"stipulated record.,no Other than a stipulation, it is unclear how par-
ties would even signal to a court that the facts are undisputed."
Litigants often stipulate facts in their briefs or filings. For exam-
ple, in United States v Risk,"2 the government
provided [the defendant] with the documentation presented to
the grand jury that entered his indictment . . . and [the defendant]
106 395 US at 60. See United States v Pope, 2010 WL 2872482, *4 (10th Cir) (interpreting
Covington as permitting "courts [to] entertain motions that require [them] to answer only pure
questions of law" because no trial of the facts is involved). Common law motions to quash rec-
ognized a similar requirement. See text accompanying notes 34-39.
107 Pope, 2010 WL 2872482 at *3 ("If contested facts surrounding the commission of the
offense would be of any assistance in determining the validity of the motion, Rule 12 doesn't
authorize its disposition before trial.").
1os See Nukida, 8 F3d at 669. See also note 27.
109 230 F3d 659 (3d Cir 2000).
110 Id at 660-61.
111 Counsel can make stipulations orally or in writing. See FRCrP 47; Serfass, 420 US at 380.
Consider Pope, 2010 WL 2872482 at *5 ("To warrant dismissal, it must be clear from the parties'
agreed representations about the facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense that a
trial of the general issue would serve no purpose.").
112 843 F2d 1059 (7th Cir 1988).
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appended these discovery materials to his motion to dismiss....
In its response, the government admitted that these facts pre-
sented by [the defendant] "essentially accurately summarize[d]
the facts which give rise to the indictment.""
And in Serfass, a draft-dodging case, the Supreme Court noted that
the material facts were taken from the defendant's affidavit and selec-
tive service file and from the oral stipulations of counsel.'"
Most circuits that have considered the question -the Third, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and DC Circuits-have adopted the undisputed
evidence position."' But other courts have also taken this approach.
For example, in United States v Gosselin World Wide Moving,"' a dis-
trict court in the Fourth Circuit considered stipulated evidence in re-
solving a summary dismissal motion. The parties stipulated facts
"form[ing] the entire factual record for the purposes of the Defend-
ants' motion to dismiss."" The court refused to consider "additional
facts that Defendants suppl[ied]" that were "not within the [parties'
joint] Statement of Facts.""' The Fourth Circuit affirmed without even
discussing the summary dismissal on procedural grounds.
As another example, consider United States v Hall."' The Tenth
Circuit dismissed an indictment for firearm possession in connection
with drug offenses. Before trial, the parties "consistently acknowl-
edged" that the material facts were undisputed: the gun was in a dif-
ferent part of the house during the underlying drug crime." The dis-
trict court agreed that the defendant could not be convicted for that
firearm violation based "solely on the presence of the pistol somewhere
in the defendant's house."2' The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal,
113 Id at 1061. Even though the government provided some voluntary discovery, it would
not be a "proffer of evidence" in the sense described in Part II.B.2; the scope of the discovery
was limited and was not consistent with the requirement that the government "make a full prof-
fer of the evidence it intends to present at trial." Alfonso, 143 F3d at 777 (emphasis added).
114 See 420 US at 380.
115 See DeLaurentis, 230 F3d at 660-61; Flores, 404 F3d at 323-25; Levin, 973 F2d at 470;
Risk, 843 F2d at 1061; United States v Hall, 20 F3d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir 1994); Yakou, 428 F3d at
247. See also note 89. Consider United States v Zayas-Morales, 685 F2d 1272 (11th Cir 1982),
which seems to approve of summary dismissals. See id at 1277-78 (noting that the dismissal was
based on "stipulated facts entered into in this case" and calling it akin to "summary judgment").
But Critzer abrogated Zayas-Morales. See Salman, 378 F3d at 1267 n 4 (noting that Zayas-
Morales allowed district courts to look at extrinsic evidence and dismiss for "the government's
inability to meet its burden of proof as a matter of law").
116 333 F Supp 2d 497 (ED Va 2004), affd in part, revd in part on other grounds, 411 F3d 502
(4th Cir 2005).
117 333 F Supp 2d at 505.
118 Id at 505-06 (emphasis added).
119 20 F3d 1084 (10th Cir 1994).
120 Id at 1085-86.
121 Id at 1086.
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noting that prior circuit precedent foreclosed the government's legal
theory: the defendant's possession of the gun was not "in connection
with" the drug offense.12 The prosecution was thus "incapable of prov-
ing its case" as a matter of law.
2. Proffered evidence.
The remaining circuit"' to have explicitly considered whether to
allow summary dismissals is the Second Circuit, which requires that
they take a certain form. Specifically, United States v Alfonso'5 re-
quired that the government "make a full proffer of the evidence it
intends to present at trial" if the court is to consider the evidence to
121be undisputed.
The source of the "full proffer" language is United States v Mennu-
ti.12 The defendants had filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the gov-
ernment could not prove the interstate commerce element of the in-
dicted offense. The prosecutor filed an affidavit in opposition to their
motion, listing the facts the government would establish at trial in prov-
ing the element.'" Neither the opinion of the district court nor that of
the court of appeals suggested that the government's factual allegations
were undisputed. 129 The government's proffer was ineffective; the facts
could not establish the interstate commerce element. The district court
dismissed the indictment, and the Second Circuit affirmed.
In Alfonso, the district court granted a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that, as in Mennuti, the government could not prove the juris-
dictional element on the alleged facts. The Second Circuit reversed
because the government had not proffered evidence as it had in Men-
nuti.' The court also disapproved of the district court's dismissal sua
sponte rather than on the defendant's motion.131 The government
needed a meaningful chance to make a "detailed presentation of the
entirety of the evidence that it would present to a jury."32 The court
122 Id at 1085-86, citing 18 USC § 924(c)(1).
123 Hall, 20 F3d at 1088-90.
124 The First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have not ruled squarely on the question. See note 90.
125 143 F3d 772 (2d Cir 1998).
126 Id at 776-77.
127 639 F2d 107 (2d Cir 1981).
128 Id at 108 n 1.
129 See United States v Mennuti, 487 F Supp 539, 540-41 (EDNY 1980); Mennuti, 639 F2d
at 108 n 1.
130 Alfonso, 143 F3d at 776-77.
131 Id at 777.
132 Id.
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also noted-without further explanation- that under its formal prof-
fer rule "the formal consent of both parties would not be required."'.
Alfonso remains the most eloquent (and most cited) exposition
of the proffered-evidence requirement, and district courts nationwide
have relied on its formulation.'" Puzzlingly, however, no other circuits
have expressly adopted its "full proffer" requirement. Although the
Eleventh Circuit's decisions in Critzer and Salman seem to embrace a
hard-line disapproval of summary dismissal,' they nonetheless con-
tain dicta that seem to support a full-proffer rule. Critzer reversed a
summary dismissal, citing the lack of a mechanism "for a pretrial de-
termination of sufficiency of the evidence."'1 Salman reversed a sum-
mary dismissal for the same reason while asserting the government's
right "to present its evidence at trial and have its sufficiency tested
under FRCrP 29."'" Despite this language, courts' reliance on Critzer
and Salman for the absolutist no-dismissal position is misplaced: they
recognize limited exceptions based on proffered evidence.3 1
III. BURDEN SHIFTING AND THE CIVIL PROCEDURE ANALOGUE
The last Part showed that courts have vacillated on whether to al-
low summary dismissals as a doctrinal matter, but that most nonethe-
less accept the procedure in one form or another. This Part shows that
summary dismissals are welfare maximizing and explains why they
should be recognized more uniformly in federal criminal procedure. It
then proposes a burden-shifting mechanism that incorporates both the
stipulated- and proffered-evidence positions. Finally, it articulates and
defends this burden-shifting mechanism as consistent with Supreme
Court decisions, the FRCrP, and the common law history.
A. Conflicting Policy Concerns
Whether courts permit summary dismissals is a function of their
willingness to allow defendants to force litigation over pure legal
questions before trial. Shifting the legal inquiry forward in this way
serves several policies underlying the FRCrP, but also creates incen-
tives for defendants and prosecutors to engage in strategic behavior.
133 Id at 777 n 7.
134 See, for example, Booker, 557 F Supp 2d at 155 (citing Alfonso for the appropriate
standard of review); United States v Doyle, 2006 WL 951881, *5 (ND Ill) (comparing the Risk-
Yakou consent requirement to "the Alfonso court's 'full proffer' requirement").
135 See note 103.
136 951 F2d at 307.
137 378 F3d at 1268. See also notes 53 and 115.




Defendants, prosecutors, and the judiciary have competing inter-
ests at stake in summary dismissals. Each of these actors is nonethe-
less concerned with judicial economy -the goal of reducing litigation
costs, defined as the time, effort, and resources expended in reaching a
case's final disposition.
This goal is so important that the Rules' drafters enshrined it in a
separate policy Rule as an interpretive canon. FRCrP 2 directs that all
rules "be interpreted to provide for the just determination of every
criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in
administration, and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay." 9
Courts have thus read a broad policy of judicial economy into the
Federal Rules, supporting "conservation of judicial resources by facili-
tating the disposition of cases without trial."'"
In civil procedure, summary judgment serves an analogous policy
goal by "cut[ting] litigation costs and reduc[ing] court dockets."..
Summary judgment obviates the need for a full trial where undisputed
facts make the factfinder unnecessary, thus allowing parties to litigate
pure questions of law early. Summary dismissals shift the legal inquiry
forward in the same way.14 Judges have discretion to give preliminary
instructions to guide the jury at the beginning of a case.'43 But normal-
ly, "instructions on the law as it applies should be given at the close of
the trial."'" FRCrP 30 does not explicitly permit litigants to request
binding jury instructions before trial. Summary dismissals therefore
offer defendants an alternative way to litigate the law governing the
case before trial."
139 FRCrP 2 (emphasis added).
14 United States v Smith, 866 F2d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir 1989). See also United States v Levin,
973 F2d 463,467 (6th Cir 1992).
141 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liabili-
ty Crisis," and Efficiency Clichds Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78
NYU L Rev 982,1043-44 (2003).
142 See Part I.D.2.
143 See LaFave, et al, 6 Criminal Procedure § 24.8(a) at 476-82 (cited in note 20).
144 Id at 477. See also text accompanying note 67.
145 The "law of the case" doctrine limits litigants' ability to challenge rulings on legal issues
from earlier stages of the same litigation. See United States v Phillips, 367 F3d 846, 856 (9th Cir
2004) ("Issues that a district court determines during pretrial motions become law of the case.");
United States v Escobar-Urrego, 110 F3d 1556,1560 (11th Cir 1997). A ruling denying the defend-
ant's summary dismissal motion would analyze and decide at least some of the legal issues pre-
sented in the motion. If facts proven at trial turned out to be different from the "undisputed"
facts presented on the pretrial record, the outcome of the applied legal principles might be dif-
ferent, but the underlying legal issues would remain the same.
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Sometimes answers to these questions will be dispositive, justify-
ing early resolution of the case. Consider United States v Levin."' The
government charged the defendant with accepting Medicare-related
kickbacks, but administrative opinion letters established that the de-
fendant's indicted conduct "[did] not constitute reimbursement
abuse."' The indictment did not mention the opinion letters, the exis-
tence of which was undisputed. The trial judge told the government
that going to trial to "put on what we know the evidence will be"
would be a waste of time. The district court dismissed the indictment,
holding that the government could not establish intent as a matter of
law.149 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, suggesting that the district court's
concerns about judicial economy properly reflected the FRCrP's gen-
eral policy "encourag[ing] district courts to entertain and dispose of
pretrial criminal motions."
Summary dismissals allow the parties to forego litigation costs
when the government's case is a loser as a matter of law. Proceeding
to trial imposes substantial costs not only on the court, but also on the
parties. These costs include preparatory and active litigation time, ex-
penses, and lost opportunities to pursue other work. Even though a
defendant triggers all of these costs by exercising his jury trial rights,
he has a right to do so: courts cannot in the interests of efficiency pe-
nalize defendants for exercising procedural rights.15 If courts and
litigants could generally channel cases toward summary dismissal,
146 973 F2d 463 (6th Cir 1992).
147 See United States v Levin, 1990 WL 278295, *1 (ED Ky).
148 Levin, 973 F2d at 466.
149 Id.
150 Id at 467. See also United States v Nukida, 8 F3d 665,670 (9th Cir 1993) ("Rule 12 serves
to help conserve 'judicial resources by facilitating the disposition of cases without trial."').
151 See, for example, Ellen Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J Crim L &
Criminol 731, 751 (2007) ("Deciding whether to take the risk [of trial] may also be a function of
money, as the cost of legal counsel can influence the ability to spend the sums necessary for a
trial, thus forcing a plea negotiation to preserve assets for the offender's family.").
152 See Bordenkircher v Hayes, 434 US 357, 363 (1978) (suggesting that "[tjo punish a per-
son because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the
most basic sort," but finding that the coercion implicit in plea bargaining is not such a violation);
United States v Derrick, 519 F2d 1, 4-5 (6th Cir 1975):
We simply hold that it is improper for a trial judge to impose a heavier sentence as a penal-
ty for the exercise of the right of jury trial, or as an example to deter others from exercising
the right. Such motives ... have little if any relevance to the proper objectives of sentencing.
See also United States v Jones, 997 F2d 1475, 1481 (DC Cir 1993) (en banc) (Mikva dissenting)
(noting the Supreme Court's willingness to allow "players other than the judge to plea-bargain, to
horse-trade, to create incentives and disincentives for the way in which a criminal defendant
plays his constitutional cards") (emphasis added). But see Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure
Entitlements, Professionalism, and Lawyering Norms, 61 Ohio St L J 801,812 (2000) (recounting
nonetheless that in practice some judges penalize parties who insist on going to trial).
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however, institutional actors could apply their time and resources to-
ward other judicial business."'
It seems unexceptional that society would benefit if summary
dismissal procedures resulted in a net reduction of these costs by
avoiding unnecessary trials.'5 Even if summary dismissal procedures
imposed their own costs,' they would not likely exceed trial costs. For
cases that would have gone to trial anyway, channeling them toward
summary dismissal would likely result in net cost reduction. In fact,
net-cost-reduction concerns might partially account for the increase in
civil cases disposed of at summary judgment."4
If predictions that summary dismissals are welfare maximizing
are correct, it should be unsurprising that several states have pretrial
procedures similar (but not identical) to summary dismissal." For ex-
ample, in Commonwealth v Brandano," the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court (SJC) outlined a procedure for pretrial dismissals on
the merits that would "not be constitutionally offensive" in light of
153 Consider Smith, 866 F2d at 1097 (noting that "conservation of judicial resources by
facilitating the disposition of cases without trial ... is served by many procedural rules"); United
States v Valle, 697 F2d 152, 154 (6th Cir 1983) ("The district court is, therefore, without authority
to dismiss an otherwise valid indictment on the basis of its belief that government resources
should not be devoted to the prosecution of a particular defendant.").
154 Consider Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 Yale L J 1969,
1975 (1992) (suggesting that compromise benefits society by reducing prosecutors' opportunity
costs associated with trying any given defendant). Whether summary dismissal results in net cost
reduction is an empirical question beyond the scope of this Comment.
155 To the extent that such costs are speculative (but might be estimated in a future empiri-
cal analysis), for now they might be estimated as equal to the costs of summary judgment. Com-
pare Miller, 78 NYU L Rev at 1043 (cited in note 141) (explaining how benefits outweigh costs)
with id at 1048 (explaining criticisms that costs outweigh benefits).
156 Id at 1044 n 332 (citing commentators who have spoken approvingly about summary
judgment's capability to cut costs). The opposite trend appears to have occurred in criminal
procedure. Annual case-disposition rates in federal courts had several modal years (1971 to
1975) for the undifferentiated category of dismissals (which presumably included some pretrial
dismissals). Those years coincide with the period of the Court's decisions from Sisson to Serfass.
Since then, the absolute number of annual dismissals has stayed reasonably steady while the
absolute number of annual prosecutions has doubled; thus the relative annual rate of dismissal
has halved in that time. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics
Online table 5.22.2008 ("BJS Online Sourcebook"), online at http://www.albany.edulsourcebook/
pdf/t5222008.pdf (visited Sept 1, 2010). Two preliminary explanations are possible. First, pretrial
dismissals might not have the same salience among defense counsel as they had during the Sis-
son-Serfass era. (There is no indication that the standard for dismissal have become more oner-
ous.) Second, counsel might have abandoned the process after determining that such motions did
not result in net cost reduction. Absent better data, any such conclusions are speculative at best.
157 For examples of procedures that allow pretrial dismissal in criminal cases involving undis-
puted facts, see State v Dunn, 916 P2d 952, 953-54 (Wash App 1996); Paul O'Neil, Rule 3.190(c)(4):
A Rule Meant to Be Broken?, 37 Stetson L Rev 339,367--68 (2007) (discussing Florida's rule).
158 269 NE2d 84 (Mass 1971).
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separation of powers concerns."' The procedure permits defendants to
"file an affidavit in support of a dismissal which shall contain all the
facts and the law relied upon," authorizes the prosecution to "file a
counter affidavit," and grants trial judges discretion to hold hearings
on disputed issues. In Rosenberg v Commonwealth,"' the SJC reiter-
ated the importance of government consent by limiting dismissal to
cases where the prosecution "agrees to join in the affidavit procedure
or in a stipulation of the facts." 162Furthermore, the SJC invoked judi-
cial economy in noting that Brandano dismissals would be appropriate
when they would "avoid[] ... the defendant's ordeal in participating in
what may be an unnecessary trial" or would "avoid[] ... substantial
and unnecessary public expense."M
2. Government appellate rights.
In addition to judicial economy, the Rules foster the policy of
preserving litigants' appellate rights. Specifically, FRCrP 12(d) admon-
ishes courts not to "defer ruling on a pretrial motion if the deferral
will adversely affect a party's right to appeal."" Because the govern-
ment may not appeal from certain kinds of dispositive prodefense
rulings, the Alfonso court noted that "the government may actually
favor" summary dismissals when the district judge would otherwise
rule for the defendant on a nonappealable motion, such as a pre-
verdict directed acquittal.
Consider an example. If a defendant successfully moved for a di-
rected acquittal after the government's case-in-chief but before the
jury returned its verdict, the government would not be able to ap-
peal.6 Had the defendant won on summary dismissal, the government
would have been able to appeal.16' By considering summary dismis-
sals-and not deferring ruling on the defendant's dispositive legal
challenge-courts uphold the FRCrP 12(d) policy favoring appellate
159 Id at 86-87. See also Commonwealth v Cheney, 800 NE2d 309, 312-14 (Mass 2003)
(holding that state-constitution separation of powers principles bar a court from dismissing an
indictment over the prosecution's objection merely to serve "the interests of public justice").
160 Brandano, 269 NE2d at 88.
161 360 NE2d 333 (Mass 1977).
162 Id at 336. Dismissal over the prosecution's objection is still available through a "contin-
uance without a finding" procedure, subject to the requirements of Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 278,
§ 18 (West). See Cheney, 800 NE2d at 312.
163 Rosenberg, 360 NE2d at 336.
16 FRCrP 12(d).
165 143 F3d at 777 n 7.
166 See Smith v Massachusetts, 543 US 462,467 (2005).
167 See Serfass, 420 US at 389 (permitting appeal from a pretrial dismissal because jeopardy
had not yet attached).
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rights. Some courts have emphasized that a "post-verdict ruling under
168Rule 29" would be appealable and would serve the same purpose.
But judicial economy concerns undercut this suggestion: trial costs
should be avoided if the defendant would ultimately prevail on his
legal argument.
Because summary dismissals turn on pure legal questions, pre-
serving appellate rights is also important for ensuring adequate judi-
cial review of lower court rulings. Appellate review imposes uniformi-
ty across, and polices the boundaries of, federal criminal law. This
could be especially important in marginal cases involving "creative"
prosecutions'" where the government is unsure whether the indicted
conduct even fits within the statute.o
3. Ex ante information in plea bargaining.
Defense counsel may feel uncomfortable with summary dismis-
sals because jeopardy has not yet attached."' They may want to wait
until the directed-acquittal stage to raise a winning legal argument to
take advantage of double jeopardy protections. 2 But all else being
equal, waiting would expose the defendant to an increased risk of
criminal liability and would likely forfeit any sentencing discounts the
defendant would receive by pleading guilty.73
168 DeLaurentis, 230 F3d at 660-61.
169 See J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment: Reflections on Michael, Mar-
tha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 Geo Mason L Rev 45, 52 (2007) ("[P]rosecutors have used new theo-
ries to expand the boundaries of white collar criminal law in ever more creative ways."). See
generally Harvey A. Silverglate, Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent (En-
counter 2009).
170 Consider Risk, 843 F2d at 1061-62 (rejecting the government's legal theory where the
statute applied only to banks, not their employees).
171 Except if the defendant waives a jury trial. See Part I.D.2. Double jeopardy would not pre-
clude the government from reindicting a defendant who successfully moved for summary dismissal.
See United States v Gamble, 141 F3d 621, 623 (6th Cir 1998); Part I.D.2. Reindictment would be
unlikely, however, if the original charges reflected the government's strongest legal theory.
172 Thanks to Harvey Silverglate for this point. Consider United States v Findley, 439 F2d
970,974 (1st Cir 1971):
If an appeal will lie in the present case, while it cannot if the defendant waits and subjects him-
self to jeopardy, informed counsel believing they have a defense on the merits will henceforth
protect their clients by avoiding an expediting procedure otherwise beneficial to all con-
cerned, and only ignorant and ill-advised defendants will subject their defense on the merits
to a government appeal.
While Serfass suggested that amendments to 18 USC § 3731 abrogated Findley's main holding,
see Serfass, 420 US at 393, Findley's concern for potential strategic behavior remains valid today.
173 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Hary L Rev 2463,
2546 (2004) (suggesting that prosecutors "induce pleas with deep discounts off inflated post-trial
sentences" in order to avoid going to trial).
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Summary dismissal motions-even unsuccessful ones-benefit
defendants by providing additional information for evaluating wheth-
er to plead guilty."' Consider an example based on United States v Ku-
chinski,"' in which the defendant pleaded guilty to knowingly receiv-
ing and possessing child pornography."' He admitted liability for 110
images, but was sentenced for another 15,000 images that existed in
his computer's temporary file cache."' The Ninth Circuit vacated and
remanded for resentencing, noting that without specific evidence that
the defendant had knowledge of and "dominion and control" over the
cache files, the government could not prove knowledge-and should
never have indicted him under those facts in the first place.7 8
Kuchinski is inapposite because it did not involve a motion to
dismiss."' But imagine an analogous prosecution for possession in
which the indictment alleged that all of the images were in his com-
puter's cache files, even though the defendant and government agreed
that someone else had downloaded the images."' If the defendant
could use a summary dismissal method to test the legal question of
whether the government could prove knowledge as a matter of law,
that information would alter the expected payoffs of pleading guilty
or going to trial.
Incomplete information about the viability of the government's
legal theory likely contributes to the high rate of guilty pleas in feder-
al criminal cases."' Factors in the plea-bargain calculus are more com-
plex than can be described here,"' but even a coarse-grained analysis
174 See id at 2531-32 (noting that prosecutors and defendants, and especially "nonrepeat
players" and innocent defendants, suffer from asymmetrical information about the likelihood of
success at trial). See also Mabry v Johnson, 467 US 504, 508 (1984) ("[P]lea agreements are con-
sistent with the requirements of voluntariness and intelligence-because each side may obtain
advantages when a guilty plea is exchanged for sentencing concessions, the agreement is no less
voluntary than any other bargained-for exchange."). On the other hand, prosecutors might price
their plea deals by requiring defendants to forego summary dismissal in exchange for a sentence
reduction. See Easterbrook, 101 Yale L J at 1975 (cited in note 154). See also note 194 and ac-
companying text.
175 469 F3d 853 (9th Cir 2006).
176 Id at 856.
177 Id.
178 Id at 863.
179 Kuchinski appealed his conviction and sentence. 469 F3d at 855-57.
180 See, for example, United States v Luken, 515 F Supp 2d 1020, 1027-29 (D SD 2007) (in-
voking the Eighth Circuit's no-dismissal position in rejecting summary dismissal on "knowledge"
about child pornography contained in computer cache files).
181 See BJS Online Sourcebook at table 5.22.2008 (cited in note 156) (noting that in 2008
guilty pleas terminated 87 percent of all federal criminal prosecutions and 96 percent of prosecu-
tions that result in a guilty judgment). Of course, uncertainty about the underlying factual issues
likely contributes to many other guilty pleas.
182 See Talia Fisher, The Boundaries of Plea Bargaining: Negotiating the Standard of Proof,
97 J Crim L & Criminol 943,957 (2007).
[77:18411864
Summary Dismissals
suggests that summary dismissals can provide valuable information. A
successful motion confirms the defendant's decision not to plead
guilty at the outset. By contrast, an unsuccessful motion tells the de-
fendant that the pure legal argument is a loser. Absent other defenses
that he can raise, he should consider pleading guilty before trial to
take advantage of any remaining sentencing discounts.
4. Preserving the jury's role as factfinder.
Summary dismissals preserve the divide between the judge's and
jury's respective roles. A jury cannot reasonably convict on a flawed
legal theory, even if it is convinced by the facts. As explained in
Part I.D.2, while a judge deciding a summary dismissal motion cannot
"make any determination regarding [the defendant's] guilt or inno-
cence," legal questions presented in such motions are not the general
issue.' Such motions ask whether the government is incapable of
proving its case due to a flawed legal theory-not a lack of convincing
evidence of guilt. Summary dismissal thus does not inquire whether
the defendant is guilty or innocent, or whether "the government could
not prove its case," but rather inquires whether "there was no case to
prove."" Judges are well positioned to resolve such questions effi-
ciently and economically, and to prevent cases from being submitted
to the jury unnecessarily.
By limiting summary dismissals to cases where the government's
legal theory is flawed and there are no factual disputes, courts main-
tain the institutional separation between judge and jury. The limitation
also serves as a threshold question that screens the cases that are eli-
gible for summary dismissal adjudication. Most cases that are not
pleaded out or selected for bench trial will still go to juries; only in
rare cases will defendants agree with the government's factual allega-
tions yet nonetheless choose to litigate and challenge its legal theory.
5. Minimizing strategic behavior.
Courts sometimes require the government to "consent" to a
summary dismissal procedure."' In one sense, consent might refer to
the government's willingness to give the defendant a nolle prosequi.7
183 Serfass, 420 US at 389.
184 Risk, 843 F2d at 1061 (emphasis added). See also Hall, 20 F3d at 1088 (noting that "[a]n
indictment should be tested solely on the basis of the allegations made on its face, and such
allegations are to be taken as true").
185 See note 7.
186 See Yakou, 428 F3d at 247 (collecting cases requiring consent).
187 See, for example, FRCrP 48 (permitting federal prosecutors to dismiss an indictment
without the defendant's consent).
2010] 1865
1866 The University of Chicago Law Review [77:1841
In another sense, consent might simply be shorthand for the Supreme
Court's apparent requirement that facts alleged for motions be truly
undisputed.'" For example, under Alfonso's "full proffer" rule, the
government consents by proffering its evidence, ensuring that the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss does not misrepresent the government's
factual allegations. And under the majority stipulated-evidence rule,
the government consents by stipulating to the defendant's allegations
about facts outside the indictment. (The government need not "con-
sent" in this way when the defendant stipulates to the government's
allegations, because the underlying concern about undisputed evi-
dence disappears.)
Practical reasons support a consent requirement. Without one,
defendants would have incentives to make nonmeritorious motions
routinely -either to delay or as part of a try-anything defense strat-
egy." Courts and prosecutors might therefore worry that summary
dismissals present a serious "floodgates" problem.'9But while sum-
mary dismissal motions would increase the government's pretrial liti-
gation costs, some defendants' motions would be successful-in turn
decreasing the government's trial litigation costs. Moreover, while the
188 Consider Smith v Mississippi, 162 US 592 (1896); Neal v Delaware, 103 US 370 (1880).
The Supreme Court held in these cases that for a defendant to challenge his conviction because
the government had historically excluded black jurors, the government must not dispute his
factual allegations. See Smith, 162 US at 601, citing Neal, 103 US at 396. In Smith and Neal, pros-
ecutors denied and admitted the defendants' allegations, respectively. The Smith court refused to
let the defendant bypass evidentiary rules by alleging facts in a motion-unless the government
consented by stipulation or by waiving objection.
189 Notwithstanding any possible incentives, some have argued that defense counsel are
ethically obliged to pursue such strategies. See, for example, John Wesley Hall, Jr, Professional
Responsibility in Criminal Defense Practice § 3:11.50 at 17-23 (West Supp 2010). See also United
States v Wade, 388 US 218,258 (1967) (White concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explain-
ing that defense counsel often engage in strategic practices that "in many instances ha[ve] little, if
any, relation to the search for truth," but that we nonetheless "countenance or require" because
the practices serve the defendant's interests).
There may also be a risk that defense counsel will pretend that facts are undisputed to test
the legal theory, but litigate the case full bore if the motion is denied-on the theory that stipula-
tions are not proof and cannot estop the defense from changing arguments midstream. But there
are two reasons why risk-averse defense counsel will not stipulate unnecessarily. First, stipula-
tions may not be as flexible as assumed. See James Joseph Duane, Screw Your Courage to the
Sticking-Place: The Roles of Evidence, Stipulations, and Jury Instructions in Criminal Verdicts, 49
Hastings L J 463, 470 n 35 (1998) ("[T]he better reasoned authorities have properly held that a
voluntary defense stipulation amounts to a valid waiver of [the defendant's] right to a jury de-
termination of that factual issue."). Second, judges and prosecutors enforce informal professional
norms, providing a nominal check against abuse of the system. See Brown, 61 Ohio St L J at 812
(cited in note 152) ("Prosecutors can withhold favorable plea bargain terms from uncooperative
defense counsel and discretionary favors such as open file discovery.").
19 See generally Toby Stern, Federal Judges and Fearing the "Floodgates of Litigation," 6 U
Pa J Const L 377 (2003).
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Nabors rule (rejecting summary dismissals) might mitigate floodgates
concerns, it would decrease judicial economy.
Requiring consent also addresses concerns that summary dismis-
sals would become fishing expeditions for illicit discovery.1 For exam-
ple, it would be suboptimal if defendants could game the system by us-
ing a motion to dismiss to force the government to articulate specific
facts underlying the indictment. An ideal solution would ensure that, if
the government must respond, it would not have to reveal more evi-
dence than necessary to show that a material fact is actually disputed.
Of course, prosecutors also have incentives to game the process.
They might withhold consent nonmeritoriously, even in cases plainly
satisfying the predicate requirements for summary dismissal.", For
example, informational asymmetries allow the government to extract
plea bargains at a higher rate than would occur with more complete
information; similarly, prosecutors benefit from early case dispositions
and price offers of leniency accordingly.194 They might either condition
a plea bargain on the defendant not seeking a summary dismissal or
refuse to give consent under a consent requirement.
B. The Burden-Shifting "Summary Judgment" Rule
Courts sometimes compare summary dismissal to summary
judgment."' FRCP 56(c) authorizes summary judgment when "there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law."" Courts decide summary judgment
motions based on evidence external to the pleadings.'" As Part I.D.2
191 See text accompanying notes 50 and 98. Such concerns may be warranted. See Hall,
Criminal Defense Practice § 3:11.50 at 21-22 (cited in note 189) (arguing that it would be ethical
to file a suppression motion for ulterior motives, such as gaining an "opportunity to examine the
police officers about the circumstances of finding contraband" when the defendant is not entitled
to that evidence, and suggesting that such tactics are not uncommon).
192 See Part III.B.
193 This is not an abstract concern: in circuits requiring waiver, district courts have refused
to consider a motion as soon as the government objects. See, for example, United States v China
Star, 375 F Supp 2d 1291, 1293 (D NM 2005).
194 See Easterbrook, 101 Yale L J at 1975 (cited in note 154). See also text accompanying
notes 151-54 and 170. Risk-averse prosecutors may tolerate lower likelihoods of success at trial
if they can propose a conditional plea bargain. Consider Peter John Koenig, An Economic Analysis
of the Prosecutor *37 (unpublished PhD dissertation, Ohio State University, 1981) (arguing that
substitution and wealth effects undermine the "conventional wisdom that the prosecutor treats
defendants pleading guilty more leniently than those demanding trials").
195 See notes 96 and 136-38.
196 FRCP 56(c).
197 See Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317, 322 (1986) (requiring postdiscovery summary
judgment when a party bearing the burden of proof "fails to make a showing sufficient to estab-
lish the existence of an element essential to that party's case"). See also Matsushita Electrical
Industrial Co v Zenith Radio, 475 US 574, 586 (1986) (shifting the burden to the nonmoving
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explained, however, there are serious limits to how accurate those
comparisons are. Summary judgment features a burden-shifting mech-
anism that can nonetheless be imported into summary dismissal to
address many of the policy concerns outlined in Part III.A.19 8 More-
over, as Part III.C explains, Covington provides an example of how
burden shifting would work.
Motion practice normally proceeds as follows: once the movant
argues for dismissal, the burden shifts to the opponent to show why
the motion should not be granted in the movant's favor. The kind of
burden shifting proposed here is different. Not only must the govern-
ment show why the defendant's legal argument is incorrect in order to
defeat summary dismissal, it may also try to show that the court
should not even address the merits of the motion because material
facts are disputed. This is similar to the requirement that a party op-
posing civil summary judgment "come forward with specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," which would avoid ad-
judication of the summary judgment motion in the first place.'" Bur-
den shifting on the merits is thus distinct from burden shifting on
whether the court should even engage in a merits analysis.
Burden shifting is quite simple. First, the defendant determines
the government's legal and factual theory of the case. This may come
about through the indictment's allegations, the defendant's own know-
ledge of the case, a bill of particulars, or (limited) pretrial discovery.
Second, the defendant moves to dismiss, stipulating to the indict-
ment's factual allegations. As in a motion for summary judgment, this
motion would allege "no factual dispute,"20 would point to any exter-
nal evidence that would mean the government has no case to prove,
and would develop a legal theory to that effect. In other words, the
motion would concede the government's factual allegations, point to
additional facts (if appropriate), and explain why the government's
interpretation of the law is wrong.
Third, the burden shifts to the government to show why the dis-
trict court should not decide the motion. To satisfy that burden, the
government as nonmoving party would raise a new issue of material
fact by "showing a need for further factual inquiries."201 This procedure
party, who must present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," without
which there is no factual dispute for the jury to try), quoting FRCP 56(e). For a procedural dis-
cussion of summary judgment, see Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane,
10A Federal Practice and Procedure § 2726 at 440-54 (West 3d ed 1998).
198 For a general discussion of summary judgment burden shifting, see Edward Brunet and Mar-
tin Redish, Summary Judgment: Federal Law and Practice § 5:1-5:9 at 89-119 (West 3d ed 2006).
199 Matsushita Electrical, 475 US at 586-87. See also note 7.
200 Covington, 395 US at 60.
201 Id at 60-61. See United States v Smith, 866 F2d at 1096 n 5.
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would be tailored to the discretion of the trial judge. A default rule
would direct the government to make the showing on the record-
perhaps as a proffer of the evidence that the government would ex-
pect to prove at trial, as the Alfonso rule requires. In addition to this
default rule, the trial judge could decide whether the interests of jus-
tice would be served by hearing the government's showing, and re-
lated factual allegations, in camera. Trial judges often review sensitive
evidence in camera, such as when the government opposes disclosure
of potentially exculpatory evidence.2 Other than the shift to in cam-
era review-necessitated by the defendants' limited pretrial discovery
rights-the government would not have to make any more of a show-
ing than the opponent of a civil summary judgment motion would
have to make in "set[ting] out specific facts showing a genuine issue
for trial."
Fourth, on the basis of the motion and the government's reply,
the court determines whether the government made this showing. If it
did, the motion would be properly denied and the case would go to
trial. But if it failed to make this showing, the judge would decide the
legal question presented in the motion.
Ultimately, the inquiry is whether the motion raises a pure ques-
tion of law for which there is "no factual dispute" and about which a
full trial on the merits would be "of no assistance in determining the
validity" of the defendant's legal argument.20 If the facts are truly un-
disputed, a jury trial would be "of no assistance": the judge, not the
jury, decides legal questions. Summary dismissal would be proper if
the prosecution would necessarily fail if a certain legal question were
resolved in the defendant's favor, precluding the government's ability
to prove that element as a matter of law.
C. Burden Shifting, Case Law, and the Choice of Rules
The burden-shifting mechanism proposed in Part III.B is consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's case law, the FRCrP, and the pre-Rules
common law framework. Moreover, this burden-shifting mechanism
captures the functionality of both the majority stipulated-evidence
rule and the Alfonso proffered-evidence rule.
1. Supreme Court case law.
The Supreme Court has never ruled that summary dismissals in
criminal procedure are either proper or improper. But when several of
202 See United States v Agurs, 427 US 97, 106 (1976); Application of Storer Communica-
tions, Inc, 828 F2d 330,335 (6th Cir 1987).
203 Covington, 395 US at 60.
2010] 1869
The University of Chicago Law Review
its decisions are read together, they strongly support recognizing a
summary dismissal mechanism.
In Covington, the defendant was indicted for not paying a state
law marijuana tax. He claimed that doing so would reveal his in-
volvement in underlying drug crimes and thereby violate his Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination privilege. Covington concerned
whether he had waived that privilege, which in turn relied on a factual
question-although here, the facts were undisputed. Justice John Mar-
shall Harlan's majority opinion held that the defendant had not
waived his defense.
Covington interpreted the then-applicable version of
FRCrP 12(b)(2) as permitting pretrial motions whenever "trial of the
facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense would be of
no assistance in determining the validity of the defense."' This reflect-
ed the Rule's limitation on pretrial motions to those issues "capable of
determination without trial of the general issue." The opinion is not
fully fleshed out, but it can be interpreted as follows: if the defendant
claimed that the facts were undisputed, there would be no need to
have "trial of the facts." Covington and FRCrP 12(b)(2) are two sides
of the same coin: at no point may the judge resolve factual disputes
material to the issue of guilt or innocence," because doing so is the
province of the jury. Yet the judge may resolve factual disputes over
defenses and objections collateral to the merits, because these would
not require "trial of the facts surrounding" the merits. And he may
resolve legal disputes over the merits, because this involves neither
"trial of [any] facts" nor "trial of the general issue." The touchstone is
trial: except in a bench trial, the judge's decision on a Covington mo-
tion does not involve "trial" at all. Issues should be resolved pretrial
when doing so does not address the question of guilt or innocence,
and thus does not usurp the factfinder's role.
Justice Harlan explained that "in most cases" involving the Fifth
Amendment waiver question at issue in that case, "there will be no fac-
tual dispute," making such questions amenable to resolution on a
FRCrP 12(b)(2) motion. If the government disagreed about whether
the facts were undisputed, the burden would shift to it to "show[] a
need for further factual inquiries."" Because Covington's behavior did
not reflect waiver as a matter of law, and because the government did
not demonstrate any need for further factual inquiries, the Court de-
termined that it would be "just under the circumstances that the case be
204 Id (emphasis added).
205 Except, of course, in a bench trial.
206 Covington, 395 US at 60.
207 Id at 60-61.
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finally disposed of at this level."m The Court thus tolerated a mechan-
ism for dismissing a case on undisputed facts and a pure question of law.
The Court implicitly endorsed Covington several years later. In
Serfass, the government appealed from a summary dismissal. The de-
fendant had been indicted for dodging a draft induction order and
moved for summary dismissal. He conceded that the government
could make out a prima facie case but argued that the draft board had
unlawfully given no reason for rejecting his conscientious objector
status.' The district court dismissed on the basis of certain evidence
outside the indictment.210 The Supreme Court affirmed, noting in dicta
the district court's finding that the defendant's argument "was proper-
ly raised by motion before trial and that, although petitioner had not
waived his right to trial by jury, his defense was properly to be deter-
mined by this court."... The Supreme Court was evidently untroubled:
it did not analyze or pass judgment on the pretrial motion procedure
it described in dicta,212 addressing instead whether double jeopardy
barred government appeals from pretrial dismissals.213 Moreover, the
government's brief cited Covington in conceding that the district court
could look to the stipulated record to figure out whether the draft
board had erred in its refusal to grant Serfass conscientious objector
status. That brief never even suggested that pretrial dismissals on such
grounds were improper.
In short, summary dismissal motions have never come squarely
before the Court. Covington and Serfass are the closest examples. And
dicta in Serfass reported the court of appeals' conclusion that there
was "no significant constitutional difference" between motions to
dismiss arguing that "the defendant had established a defense as a
matter of law" and those arguing that "there were insufficient facts as
a matter of law to support a conviction."2 Absent any indications
(from these or other cases) that the Court disapproves of the theory
of summary dismissals, the Court's unexceptional treatment of FRCrP
12(b)(2) motions so far suggests there are no obvious doctrinal bar-
riers to their use.
208 Id at 61.
209 Serfass, 420 US at 379.
210 Id at 379-80.
211 Id at 380 n 1, citing Covington, 395 US at 60.
212 See Serfass, 420 US at 380.
213 See id at 382-83.
214 See Brief for the United States, Serfass v United States, No 73-1424, *26-27 (US filed
July 25, 1974) (available on Westlaw at 1974 WL 186318).
215 420 US at 382.
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2. Reconciling the circuit split.
Recall that courts take three positions. Nabors rejects summary
dismissals entirely. Alfonso requires the government to reply to the
defendant's dismissal motion with a "full proffer" of its evidence be-
fore a court can consider the facts as the basis of the motion's legal
argument. The rest of the courts require the evidence to be undis-
puted -which in practice means stipulated.
Nabors should be rejected wholesale. Its no-dismissal position is
inconsistent with common law motions to quash." It is inconsistent
with the drafting history of the FRCrP, which implicitly reserved a
place for summary dismissals. It is inconsistent with Covington and
FRCrP 12(b)(2), which recognize that issues of law may be resolved
pretrial if doing so does not involve the question of guilt or inno-
cence.217 And as a practical matter, if the government cannot establish
an element, or if it cannot disprove an affirmative defense, it would be
irrational not to dismiss the indictment. To the extent that Nabors pre-
serves a role for the factfinder even when the factfinder "would be of
no assistance," its holding is untenable.
The remaining two positions are reconcilable by reconfiguring
the proffered-evidence rule and the stipulated-evidence rule as corol-
laries to the burden-shifting mechanism. First, the stipulated-evidence
rule can be seen as the default rule under that mechanism. To satisfy
Covington and FRCrP 12(b)(2), the evidence must be undisputed, and
the defendant can signal that he does not dispute the evidence by stip-
ulating explicitly to the indictment's factual (but not legal) allegations.
This would remove any issue regarding a material fact alleged in the
indictment.
Next, the proffered-evidence rule would serve as a response to
any factual allegations the defendant made in the first instance in his
motion to dismiss. In other words, within the burden-shifting mechan-
ism, the Alfonso-Mennuti proffer rule would be lexically inferior to
the stipulated-evidence rule. If the government does not dispute any of
the defendant's own factual allegations, it could stipulate to them and
remove any issue of material fact-clearing the way for the court to
decide the summary dismissal motion on the merits. If the government
does dispute any of the defendant's allegations and wants to prevent
the court from deciding the motion's merits, then under the burden-
shifting mechanism, it would have to "show[ a need for further factual
216 See Part I.B.
217 See text accompanying notes 204-06.
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inquiries" by the factfinder.218 The proffer rule provides one way of
making this showing, and Part III.B's suggestion of in camera review
provides another.
The stipulated-evidence and proffered-evidence rules make more
sense when considered together than separately. The defendant can
stipulate to the government's factual allegations, removing any issue
pertaining to those facts, even without a formal or full proffer of the
government's evidence. And either the government can stipulate to
the defendant's factual allegations, or it can come forward with a prof-
fer showing why the evidence is, in fact, undisputed. When these rules
are put side-by-side, the parties indicate the absence of a dispute over
any material fact through the burden-shifting mechanism described in
Part III.B. Stipulation is a way for the parties to signal that the facts
are not disputed; the burden shifts to the government to either stipu-
late or make a proffer showing that facts are disputed. If the facts are
truly undisputed, a judge is well positioned to resolve a motion to
dismiss by determining whether the factual allegations and the parties'
legal theories warrant going to trial and submitting the case to a jury.
CONCLUSION
The burden-shifting mechanism outlined here is consistent with
most courts' approval of a procedure that allows judges to consider pre-
trial motions to dismiss when the parties stipulate facts or the govern-
ment has proffered evidence. It is also consistent with those courts that
require government consent. Even so, whether a defendant can seek a
summary dismissal depends on the discretion of the trial judge.219
Summary dismissals will help defendants who want to test the
merits of a pure legal argument. Because jeopardy will not yet have
attached, defendants may hesitate before relying on this mechanism:
the government could simply reindict under a slightly different theory.
218 Covington, 395 US at 60-61. See also Smith, 866 F2d at 1096 n 5. By proffering facts in
response to a motion to dismiss, the prosecutor in Mennuti seems to have been trying to do
exactly this. See notes 127-29.
219 If litigants cannot convince individual courts to adopt the burden-shifting mechanism
articulated above, then the question may be ripe for administrative rulemaking. The Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules hears suggestions to amend the FRCrP. It recently considered
(but tabled) a proposal to alter FRCrP 12(b)(3)(B) by requiring defendants to challenge the
technical validity of an indictment before trial, rather than at any time. See Memorandum from
the Honorable Richard C. Tallman, Chair, Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to the Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure, Report of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules *3-4 (Dec 15, 2008), online at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CR12-2008.pdf (visited Sept 1,
2010). Similar administrative action on FRCrP 12(b)(2), officially recognizing summary dismis-
sals, would be salutary.
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Federal prosecutors might therefore prefer that defendants use sum-
mary dismissals rather than wait until midtrial to raise a FRCrP 29
motion, which would be unappealable in many circumstances.
Summary dismissals are not likely to become a major part of fed-
eral criminal practice, because the predicate circumstances-
undisputed facts and a nonfrivolous legal argument that would dis-
pose of the indicted charge if resolved in the defendant's favor-
rarely occur. Yet when they do occur, defense counsel should consider
moving for summary dismissal. Not only would clients have more in-
formation in deciding whether to plead guilty, but if they won the mo-
tion, they would be out of prison temporarily-if not permanently-
and earlier than they otherwise would be.
